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Abstract: Direct and unmediated communication between the leader and the people a 
definitive and constitutive element of populism. I examine how the terrain of social 
media, and communicative practices typical to it, function as sites and modes for 
constituting competing models of the leader, the people and their relationship in 
contemporary Indian politics. Building on Laclau‘s proposition that ‗all democratic 
politics would tend to populism‘, I suggest that in India a form of competitive 
electoral populism is at play. Social media was mobilised for creating a parliamentary 
majority for Narendra Modi, who dominated this terrain, master the use of different 
platforms such as comments sections on news portals, Facebook, Twitter and 
WhatsApp, to access and enrol different social groups into a winning coalition behind 
his claims to a ‗developmental sovereignty‘ ratified by ‗the people‘. Following his 
victory, other parties and political formations have established substantial presence on 
these platforms. I examine the strategies of some of these parties, and of emerging 
subaltern politics, of using social media to voice criticisms of Modi and offer 
alternative leader-people relations. Their use of social media as ‗counter-archive‘ 
leads to a ‗democratization of social media‘, in which new platforms and modes of 
satirizing and criticizing Modi are constantly emerging. These practices of critiquing 
and disseminating such critiques suggest the outlines of possible ‗counter-people‘ 
available for enrolment in populism‘s future forms. I conclude with remarks about the 
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connection between activated citizens on social media, and the fragility of hegemony 
in the domain of politics more generally. 
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(Figure 1: Modi’s Social Media Presence) 
 
Introduction: Social Media and Connective Politics Beyond Social 
Movements 
 
On January 24 2017, India‘s ruling party, the BJP, proudly tweeted that 
Narendra Modi, its iconic PM of India, had become ―the world‘s most popular leader 
on social media.‖ Modi‘s ‗management‘ of - and dominance over - media and social 
media was a key factor contributing to his convincing win in the 2014 general 
election, when he led his party to a parliamentary majority, winning 31% of the votes 
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cast. In this paper, I explore the role of media and social media in the constitution of 
‗Modi‘: as a ‗political brand‘, as a political ‗style‘, and as a populist political project.2  
 
The literature on social media and popular politics has focused on the use 
made of such media by social movements (eg. Howard and Hussain 2013; Gerbaudo 
2012), and election campaigns, concluding that it increased their effectiveness. (e.g. 
van Noort et al 2014 for Holland). But the themes of this literature, such as new forms 
of civic engagement, and the logic of ‗connective‘ action, also provide a lens into a 
different form of popular politics: populism, of which direct and unmediated 
communication between the leader and the people, leading to popular consent for 
anti-democratic authority exercised by the leader, is a definitive and constitutive 
element. Dissolving, to an extent, the line between politics from ‗above‘ and ‗below‘, 
populism today both relies on, and exceeds, electoral democratic politics. 
How have social media, and communicative practices typical to it, become 
primary sites and modes for constituting competing models of the ‗leader‘, the 
‗people‘ and ‗sovereignty‘ in contemporary Indian populism? I reconsider the relation 
between the media and populism by challenging the binary of elite and popular 
media, because populism today involves precisely the breakdown of such distinctions. 
I analyse how the use of social media allowed the Modi campaign to access and enrol 
different social groups into a winning coalition behind his claims to a ‗developmental 
sovereignty‘ ratified by ‗the people‘. I suggest that while initially the social media 
terrain was clearly dominated by Modi and the BJP, parties previously sceptical of the 
uses of social media have now established substantial presence on these platforms. In 
India today, a form of competitive electoral populism is at play, in which all parties 
are populist, and offer varying but overlapping populist agendas based on different 
conceptions of the leader and the people, and social media is a constitutive feature of 
the terrain for these contestations. I examine the strategies of some of these parties, 
and of emerging subaltern politics, of using social media to voice criticisms of Modi 
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and offer alternative leader-people relations, partly by using social media as a 
‗counter-archive‘, for example practices of using Modi‘s previous speeches and 
tweets to criticise his current policies, or fact-checking his claims. I also suggest that a 
‗democratization of social media‘ is currently underway, and new modes of 
questioning, satirizing and criticizing Modi are constantly emerging. These practices 
of critiquing and disseminating such critiques suggest the outlines of possible 
‗counter-people‘ available for enrolment in populism‘s future forms. I conclude with 
remarks about the connection between activated citizens on social media, and the 
fragility of hegemony in the domain of politics more generally. 
 
News Media and Modi’s Populism 
 
Populism is a paradoxical politics, both inherently authoritarian and inherently 
democratizing. In the first case, populism bears the traces of Marx‘s idea of 
Bonapartism, and Gramsci‘s Caesarism, referring to ‗great leaders‘ who arrive to 
resolve a general crisis in the name of ‗the people‘, the true source of sovereignty. It 
is democratizing in the sense that attempts to create a singular ‗people‘ from the 
endless heterogeneity in society never succeeds, but ―the attempt to construct such a 
bridge defines the … political articulation of social identities‖ (Laclau 2007: 154 ), 
and brings into politics groups so far excluded from it.  
 
Beasley-Murray (2010) notes that populist leaders consolidate disparate 
ideological positions or political demands into a shared antagonism to prevailing 
forms of political power and authority, by dividing and simplifying the social field 
into two distinct camps, championing the "people" over a ―corrupt elite‖. The much-
noted poverty, simplicity and shallowness of symbols and slogans deployed by 
aspiring ‗great leaders‘ are efficacious precisely because they help reduce the 
heterogeneous particularistic content of social identity in the project of creating a 
homogenous people. Heterogeneous elements of society are unified and stabilized by 
the emergence of an "empty signifier," a concept or name ("nationalism", ―India 
First‖, ―Modi", etc.) embodied in a ―leader‖ who poses ―the people‖ as standing for 
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‗all of society‘, and claims power in their name from a parasitic minority that clings 
illegitimately to power.  
 
In today‘s media-saturated world, constructions of the leader and the people 
are mediated by popular culture and mass media (Mazzoleni 2007), the first 
functioning as the reservoir of meaning from which populists draw their style and 
content, and the second as the site and mechanism for their dissemination. Populists 
decry the decadence of democracy, position themselves as ‗true‘ democrats 
representing a pure ‗people‘s sovereignty‘, and voice popular grievances and opinions 
they claim are ignored by governments, mainstream parties, experts and the media. 
But such a ‗people‘ don‘t exist a priori; they are ‗composed‘ by the leader‘s 
discursive and narrative strategies, which today rely on media and social media, 
enlisting their capacities ―to influence the opinions and attitudes of mass audiences 
―(Chakrabarty and Roy 2016: 312-13). Partly, this is due to populist style. Populists, 
Mazzoleni (2007: 5) notes, have distinctive public speaking skills, media-genic 
personalities, use highly emotional, slogan-based, language, and a ―verbal radicalism 
combined with political marketing skills‖; their persona and use of media leads to fast 
dissemination of their message and an emotional identification with them, binding 
together sections of society into a ‗people‘, and the ‗people‘ to the ‗leader‘. How do 
these aspects of populism work in the case of Modi? 
Modi has spent most of his political life in Gujarat as a functionary of the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the organisation pushing the ‗Hindutva‘ 
project to create a Hindu nation. He participated in the ‗Ram Janambhoomi 
Movement‘ that destroyed the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992-3, plunging 
northern and western India into a cauldron of inter-religious violence, in which 
thousands of Muslims were killed. Modi subsequently served as a Member of 
Parliament, and as an office-bearer in the BJP‘s headquarters in Delhi. He also visited 
the US on behalf of the RSS to liaise with the ‗non-resident Indian‘ (NRI) population, 
who later became his fervent supporters.  
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(Figure 2: Modi participating in the movement to destroy the Babri Mosque) 
 
 
Modi became the Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2001, and won three 
consecutive terms. His success hinged on re-composing the ‗people‘ who would be 
his core constituency, at a time when party-voter relations were going through 
realignment in Gujarat and elsewhere following the long-term decline of the Congress 
Party, economic liberalisation and the Babri Masjid destruction. Modi campaigned as 
‗Hindu hriday samrat‘ (the emperor of Hindu hearts), successfully detaching Dalits, 
tribals and other caste and class groups from crumbling party loyalties and enrolling 
them into his Hindutva coalition. He courted Hindu godmen like Asaram Bapu, Sri 
Sri Ravi Shankar, Murari Bapu and yoga gurus like Ramdev, who had large presence 
on the new ‗spiritual‘ television channels and national following.  
 
In 2002, 59 Hindutva volunteers returning from Ayodhya were incinerated in 
a train at Godhra Station in Gujarat by some Muslims, and their charred remains were 
paraded in Ahmedabad, the regional capital, by the extreme Hindutva group, the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad. Over 3000 Muslims were killed in the subsequent large-scale 
violence. Modi was accused widely in the media of inaction, complicity, and even 
giving direction to the violence. Interviewed by Karan Thapar, the epitome of the elite 
media, Modi looked uncomfortable, and ultimately walked out. For Mukhopadhyay 
(2013) this was a turning point in Modi‘s media strategy. He started attacking elite 
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media figures, alleging corruption. This became credible after revelations of shadowy 
links between corporations, top media figures, politicians and fixers, giving rise to the 
sobriquet of ‗paid media‘ to refer to those outlets that were consistently critical of 
Modi.
3
 Modi spun criticisms of himself as attacks on Gujaratis at large, raising 
slogans of ‗Garvi Gujarat‘ and ‗Gujarati asmita‘ or ‗pride‘. He cultivated allies in 
Gujarati television, which was taking off at this time. Among Modi supporters, that he 
was ‗hounded‘ by powerful national media colluding with the Congress Party-led 
UPA governments in Delhi, but that no charges were proved relating to his role in the 
2002 violence enhanced his status, both as a victim and as an invincible man of 
integrity who had passed a ‗trial by fire‘.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Modi stands for Gujarati pride. 
 
Law and order was another key aspect of Modi‘s leadership appeal. Criticised 
for extra-judicial executions of young Muslims suspected of terrorism, Modi defied 
human rights activists, justifying them on grounds of national security. These 
executions had wide popular support and added to his profile as a strong leader. He 
                                                     
3
 This is exemplified by the ‗Radia tapes‘, leaded in 2010, of recordings between such 
a set of agents. For a brief report, see http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/The-
spotlight-is-on-the-media-now/article13673240.ece 
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was hailed as ‗Gujarat ka sher‘ (Lion of Gujarat), setting the stage for his later claims 
to a ‗56-inch chest‘.  
From the state election campaign of 2007, Modi added ‗vikas purush‘ 
(development man) to his Hindutva and Gujarati chauvinist personas. Two prominent 
newspapers, The Economic Times and The Times of India, in their Delhi and Gujarat 
editions, began to champion Modi‘s growth model (Ahamed 2013). Modi‘s projection 
of himself as a ‗development man‘ coincided with discussions in the media on 
alternative paths to rapid growth than that of the UPA government, whose 
employment and food guarantee programs, based on demands from grassroots 
movements, were criticised as ‗povertarian‘ sops-for-votes. In contrast, Modi 
championed a hard developmentalism, with decisions centralised in his hand. He 
painted social movements such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan as anti-development, 
and actively discouraged unionisation of workers. His vision of infrastructure, 
circulated on social media, put him in a lineage of Indian developmentalists like 
Nehru and Indira Gandhi, and East and Southeast Asian developmentalists more 
broadly. 
Modi held well-publicised ‗Vibrant Gujarat‘ events to attract foreign 
investment to Gujarat. Showcasing urban development in Ahmedabad and 
regeneration in post-earthquake Surat, he spoke of emulating East Asia in creating a 
grid of ‗smart cities‘, harnessing international development discourse to his project. 
He publicised the top rank given to Gujarat among Indian states on the World Bank‘s 
‗good governance‘ criterion of ‗ease of doing business‘. Modi‘s growth strategy was 
projected in the media as anti-populist, even as his political strategy and style were 
populist. In the next section, I show how Modi came to ‗embody‘ the political project 
he articulated, and how such embodiment itself was key to constructing a people who 
would ratify that project. 
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Re-composing ‘the Leader’ and ‘the People’ via Media and Social Media 
 
(Figure 4: Modi’s makeover from RSS pracharak to man of the world.) 
Social media, its culture, and its communication practices enabled Modi‘s rise 
from local leader to Prime Minister. Theories of populism rightly point to the leader‘s 
composition of the people, but populism today also involves the self-recomposition of 
the leader himself. Moving from Hindutva to ‗development‘, after 2009, Modi‘s 
physical image was made over. Glossy spreads of Modi attired in designer clothing 
and accessories, surrounded by laptops and mobile phones, playing golf, walking with 
lions, meeting foreign leaders, hosting film stars and sporting heroes, circulated in the 
media and social media, marking the transition from Spartan RSS pracharak to 
fashionista. His wardrobe was made over by famous designers. His spokespersons 
now referred to him as a ‗youth icon‘. Modi promised massive job creation aimed at 
this potential constituency, and often appeared with the supreme youth consumer item 
of choice, the mobile phone, to consolidate his identification with youth aspirations. 
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Figure 5: Modi the self(ie)-made man 
Modi‘s images embodied the aspirations of the beneficiaries of neoliberal 
reforms, who wanted more of them. Indeed, Modi used a PepsiCola slogan, ‗ye dil 
mange more‘ (this heart desires more) to address this social category he named ‗the 
neo-middle class‘ (Jaffrelot 2013). Rapid capitalist growth leading to upward mobility 
for those outside the old elite had wide appeal. Embodying a ‗desire for development‘ 
(Nigam 2011) and delivering the unfulfilled promise of India Shining (Kaur 2016), 
enabled Modi to composing a ‗people‘ beyond Hindutva. 
Modi recruited television to present a credible alternative to the leadership of 
Manmohan Singh, the scholar-technocrat Prime Minister of the UPA government. As 
the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008 were unfolding, prominent Indian news 
channels showed a split-screen with burning buildings on one side, and Modi 
castigating the government for intelligence and security failures on the other.
4
 On the 
Aap Ki Adalat (The People‘s Court) program on IndiaTV hosted by Rajat Sharma, a 
friendly anchor, Modi demanded that the UPA government stop writing ―love letters 
to Pakistan‖, and threatened that if he became PM he would ―do what he had done in 
Gujarat‖ and ―respond to Pakistan in the only language it understands.‖5 In 2013, he 
began to use cardboard replicas of the Red Fort as the backdrop to his speeches, again 
                                                     
4
 This video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=92LD42AKgV0  
5
 This video is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pxn1u2OR7q0  
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to appear as an alternative to Singh as Prime Minister.
6
 Photos of Modi next to 
portraits and statues of Vivekananda, the Hindu-monk-philosopher also circulated, 
placing Modi within a widely accepted version of muscular Hinduism.
7
 
Modi‘s strategies dovetailed with those of private television channels in a 
competitive market. Modi exploited their business logic, and channels in turn ‗rode‘ 
on Modi‘s popularity from 2013, creating hashtags likely to be picked up by Modi 
supporters. Important media houses became open Modi partisans. Arnab Goswami, 
then an anchor with TimesNow, blazed this trail on English-language television. The 
owner of ZeeTV Subhash Chandra endorsed him, and later became a BJP-supported 
member of parliament. Dainik Jagaran, a Hindu daily with 45 million readers, became 
his open supporter. When the BJP announced Modi as its Prime Ministerial candidate 
for the 2014 elections, prominent news anchors, not all of whom were Modi partisans, 
demanded that the UPA do likewise, and to have US-style debates between Modi and 
the UPA‘s nominee. The UPA‘s refusal to name a PM candidate or to agree to debate, 
created a sense of defensiveness on its part. BJP spokespersons began to refer to Modi 
as ‗Prime Minister in Waiting‘.  
 
The UPA‘s second term coincided with the global economic downturn, and 
the double-digit growth figures nearly halved. Meanwhile, (as-yet unproven) 
allegations of corruption against members of the UPA government and the Gandhi 
family began to swirl in print and television media. Modi developed a narrative that 
linked India‘s slowdown to elite corruption, and to ‗policy paralysis‘. In an extremely 
funny speech, Modi created an alphabet-primer based on alleged UPA scams.
8
 Such 
news stories enabled Modi to make the classic populist gesture of painting the corrupt 
elite as enemy of the wellbeing of the people, using a ‗low‘ language that Moffitt and 
                                                     
6
 See http://www.newsnation.in/article/17475-07092013chhattisgarh-rs-2-crore-spent-
red-fort-replica-narendra-modis-speech.html. The significance of this is that it is the 
Prime Minister who addresses the nation on August 15, Independence Day, from the 
Red Fort. 
7
 On Vivekananda and the Hindu right, see Jyotiraditya Sharma, 2014. 
8
 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a-for-adarsh-scam-b-for-bofors-says-
modi/article5112594.ece  
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Tormey (2013) identify as a key element of populist political style. 
Modi used social media penetration to sidestep and attack traditional media. 
Modi‘s social media swarm identified particular journalists and media figures for 
concerted attack, including professional and personal vilification, and allegations of 
financial corruption and allegedly decadent personal lives. Terms like ‗paid news‘ 
became commonly used on social media to denigrate Modi‘s critics. This vilification 
of the media reached its zenith when, after he was sworn into office, one of Modi‘s 
ministers coined the term ‗presstitutes‘ which, hashtagged to #Presstitutes, spread 
widely as the opprobrium of choice for media figures critical of him, helping 
delegitimise media criticism of Modi. 
While mass media changed perceptions of Modi, social media provided a deep 
and intimate identification between Modi and potential voters, who ‗participated‘ in 
building Modi‘s platform. Several themes and terms used by Modi in his campaign 
speeches were crowdsourced, based on comments and suggestions collated from the 
Modi and BJP platforms and forums on social media set up to interact with 
supporters. Modi interacted with voters via Google hangouts, with sessions streamed 
live on YouTube and his Google+ page, and in the Chai pe Charcha sessions, where 
potential voters gathered at designated tea shops to engage in discussions with Modi 
through online video hookups. (Chadha and Guha 2016: 4305).  
Below is a list of some slogans and memes launched on social media directed 
at different segments of the possible ‗people‘. 
• India First: an all-inclusive nation. 
• Sabka saath, sabka vikas (With all, for everyone‘s development) 
• Bhrashtachaar me doobe log. (Congress leaders ‗drowning in corruption‘).  
• Recovery of black money and redistributing Rs 15 lakhs to each citizen. 
• Congress mukt Bharat. (Congress-free India) 
• Ma-bete ki sarkar (the government of mother and son). Daamad Shree (Robert 
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Vadra, Sonia Gandhi‘s son-in-law, accused of land scams).  
• Shahzada (Prince, referencing Rahul Gandhi and the Gandhi dynasty, who 
were enemies of democracy.)  
• Mamooli chai wala/gareeb ma ka beta (Modi as ordinary tea vendor; son of a 
poor mother, contrasting with the Gandhis.) 
• Dand/Sazaaa do. (Punish them!) 
• Sickular. Vote bank politics. (Congress and other parties who used secularism 
cynically for votes only.) 
• Mar Jawan Mar Kisan: ―Death to the solider, death to the farmer‖. A highly 
emotive inversion of an old Congress slogan ‗jai jawan jai kisan‘ (―Victory to 
the Soldier, victory to the farmer‖). This invokes gruesome killings of Indian 
soldiers from Pakistani territory, and farmer suicides.  
• Unke liye Ganga ek nadi hai, mere liye Ganga ma hai. (For them the Ganges is 
a mere river. For me, Ganga is Ma) Mujhe Ganga Maiyya ne bulaya hai. (I 
have been called by Mother Ganges.) 
• I am a Hindu Nationalist. 
 
(Figure 6) 
These memes elicited fear, panic, trauma, joy and love, and thus strong affective links 
between the people and the leader.  
At the same time, Modi also articulated his development project in bland, byte-sized 
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slogans, such as: 
 
(Figure 7) 
Constructing a people, a leader, and a people-leader relationship needs a 
narrative of decline and crisis, the backdrop against which the leader emerges to take 
the people out of the impasse. With these slogans, ‗Modi‘ signified diverse 
aspirations, fears and resentments, which ‗called out‘ to the molecular citizen to 
identify with and accept the unity under that sign. In the next section, I explore how 
these constructions were produced, consolidated and disseminated via social media. 
 
(Figure 8) 
 
Constructing and Inhabiting the Modi-sphere: An Outsider’s View 
Social media connects users, facilitating community building, collaboration, 
and participation (Bruns 2015). While Modi‘s campaign tapped into social media‘s 
promise of ―radical innovation and participation‖ (Chakrabarty and Roy 2016: 319), it 
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retained an element of central control while enabling more decentralised practices of 
constructing a people, building ‗many-to-many communication‘ around forms of 
‗one-to-many‘ communication. Team Modi coordinated its strategies on Twitter, 
Facebook, WhatsApp and other platforms.  
 
Modi took to social media to bypass ‗elite media‘ and to establish 
‗unmediated‘ relations with the population to compose a specific ‗people‘. His well-
publicised love for social media was also part of his political makeover. Ahamed 
(2013) recounts Modi telling prominent journalist Shekhar Gupta that he checked 
social media on his iPad first thing every morning. In a heavily viewed Google 
Hangout session, he invited the audience to follow him on multiple social media 
platforms.
9
  
Modi‘s use of social media identified him as a man who was ahead of the 
times, and was constitutive of his techno-populist project. Identification with social 
media, and technology in general, allowed Modi to seek support beyond Hindutva. 
Modi spoke of wifi connectivity as a right, making it a central feature of ‗smart 
cities‘. The ability to log onto social media from any point in India became part of the 
‗desire for development‘ (Nigam 2011) among the aspirational ‗neo-middle class‘. 
Modi‘s social media campaign reflected classic and new forms of populism. 
Heading into the 2014 General Elections, I attempted a cyber-ethnography (in the 
spirit of Geertz‘s 1997 notion of ethnography as ‗deep hanging out‘). I joined debates 
in the ‗Comments‘ sections of internet news sites to observe the constitution of the 
‗people‘ and ‗leader‘, recording the reception of Modi‘s claims by readers, their 
affective relations with Modi, and how Modi supporters interacted with opponents. I 
followed websites of national news dailies, and some exclusively web-based new 
portals. My own comments were mostly factual, but also sometimes provocative and 
sarcastic to elicit responses from Modi supporters – ‗bhakts‘ (the faithful ones) in 
social-media parlance - who dominated these pages.  
 
                                                     
9
 This video can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AC4kxzRVQ3Y 
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Bhakts aimed to de-legitimise Congress figures with charges of conspiracy, 
corruption and ineptitude. Attacking its foundations, they excoriated Nehru (India‘s 
first PM) for his alleged dissolute lifestyle and affair with Lady Mountbatten, for 
losing the 1962 war with China, for ‗creating the Kashmir problem‘, for allegedly 
conspiring to get nationalist hero SC Bose assassinated, and side-lining other 
stalwarts of the anti-colonial movement such as Sardar Patel. This replicated Modi‘s 
attempt to create an alternative narrative of nationalism and postcoloniality, which 
held that many Hindutva figures functioned within the Congress, particularly Patel 
and Bose. These unsubstantiated allegations became self-evident facts.  
 
Another strategy was to maintain communal polarisation between Hindus and 
Muslims. Since the days of the Rath Yatra, the BJP had adopted its stalwart L.K. 
Advani‘s concept of ‗pseudo-secularism,‘ which mutated into ‗sickular‘ on social 
media. While Modi adopted an inclusive language, his fans identified the Congress 
and other parties opposing Modi with Muslims, a group who were in turn identified 
with Pakistan, and vilified as ‗porkies‘. Their faith was regularly abused. 
 
 
 
(Figure 8: Congress leader salutes terrorists to ‘appease’ Muslims, while berating 
the Army chief.) 
 
Bhakts attacked Modi‘s opponents as ‗libtard‘ (‗liberal retard‘), ‗AAPtard‘ 
(retarded follower of the Aam Aadmi Party), ‗sickular‘, ‗porkistani‘, ‗commie‘, 
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‗sepoy‘ or ‗Macaulay putra‘ (the last two denoting mental slaves of the West), 
demanding they ‗go to Pakistan‘. These categorisations drew sharp antagonism 
between Modi followers and opponents, the ‗us-vs-them‘ that underpins all 
constructions of ‗the people‘ and their ‗enemies‘ in populist politics. Near-identical 
comments by different accounts appeared on the same story on the same site, and on 
similar stories on other sites, suggesting coordination. 
 
In early 2014, after referring to published accounts of Modi‘s role in 2002 to 
question his suitability for the post of Prime Minister, I was ‗blocked‘ from posting 
comments on many news portals. On some sites, my sign-in was de-recognized and 
my account blocked by the external log-in protocol. Subsequently, I opened a Twitter 
account in April 2014 to observe the well-reported crescendo of online support for 
Modi as the General Elections approached.  
 
Though Modi had opened a Twitter account in 2009, Pal et al (2016) note that 
it was from 2012, after declaring his intention to become Prime Minister, that he 
became active on the platform, tweeting challenges to the UPA government, accusing 
them of bad faith and incompetence, and raising slogans and promises listed 
previously. BJP handles provided links to videos of Modi‘s speeches, which were 
retweeted by his supporters.  
 
Modi‘s used Twitter to reach youth and first-time voters. After being endorsed 
by the Bollywood star Ajay Devgn in August 2012, Modi followed several celebrity 
accounts, including mega-stars Amitabh Bachchan from Bollywood, and Rajinikanth 
from the Tamil film industry. Modi established ‗affinity‘ with these stars by visibly 
interacting with them on Twitter, and his messages were heavily retweeted among 
their millions of followers. Additionally, he consistently tweeted on youth themes. 
During the Cricket World Cup, Modi tweeted on Indian captain Dhoni as ‗Captain 
Cool‘, suggesting he was au fait with the sport which is a passion in India. Modi‘s 
campaign also consistently released hashtags suggesting development and 
nationalistic appeal, such as #IndiaDevelop. (Pal et al 2016) 
Modi‘s top tweets attacked the ‗dynastic‘ nature of the Congress party, and the 
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‗Nehru-Gandhi family‘. He mocked Sonia Gandhi‘s Italian origins and the naming of 
government projects after members of the family (Pal et al 2016). His referring to 
Rahul Gandhi, the UPA‘s presumptive PM candidate, as ‗Rahul Baba‘ (Baby Rahul) 
ridiculed and infantilised him, ruling him unfit to lead the country.  
In addition to de-legitimising the Congress and the Gandhis, Modi aimed to 
create and tighten affective bonds with his Twitter followers by launching hashtag 
campaigns. Pal et al (2016) suggest that the #SelfieWithModi hashtag from the 2014 
elections was an ―example of interaction and reciprocity… that got people talking 
about the leader as one of their own. Anyone could take a selfie …. and could then 
themselves be part of a hashtag thread they shared with their leader‖, thus ―shaping 
the citizenry‘s imagination of its political leader‖.  
Modi used Twitter as a way of composing ‗the people‘ that he would lead, and 
deriving sovereignty from them. Among youth, his active presence on social media 
contrasted with the absence of competing political figures, who thus not only looked 
out of touch but also aloof and arrogant. Retweets and likes were taken as 
endorsement of Modi‘s narrative and his programs. During a town-hall meeting 
chaired by Mark Zuckerberg at Facebook headquarters in California, Modi joked that 
because of his active on-line presence he faced several elections every day.
10
  
Apart from centralised recruitment of followers, and their diffused self-
enrolment into Modi‘s project, an amorphous self-composing of the people and their 
composing of the leader are evident in Twitter practices by Modi‘s 28.7 million 
heterogeneous followers.
11
 Some follow him for his developmental and technocratic 
governance claims. Their tweets and hashtag usage reflects support for specific 
initiatives: #SwachchBharat, #MakeInIndia, #StartUpIndia, #JandDhan, etc. His 
#SelfieWithDaughter asked fathers to tweet their photos with their daughters and 
created a ritual of union with the leader while reinforcing patriarchal model of the 
                                                     
10
 This event can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-N0d4NaMr7g  
11
 However, there are frequent reports that many of this number are ‗fake‘ followers. 
See for example, ―Massive networks of fake twitter accounts discovered.‖ The Hindu, 
January 25, 2017.  
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family. Under the hashtag #MannKiBaat, Modi solicits content for his monthly radio 
monologue, and asks for feedback. Modi also uses Twitter for ‗twiplomacy‘, 
engaging with international leaders, giving the sense of being their equal, and their 
friend, followed by world leaders such as Obama, Shinzo Abe, and Li Xinping among 
others. Pictures of Modi hugging world leaders are re-tweeted as affirmation that 
Modi had stature on the global stage. Another set of followers celebrate Modi‘s overt 
identification with aspects of Hindu culture, such as with #YogaDay, or keeping 
religious fasts, or praying in temples. Bhakts‘ tweets eulogized Modi as a superman: 
his legendary 56-inch chest, his lion-like attributes. This fulfils one desire among 
many Indians to see India as a ‗vishwaguru‘ (Teacher to the World), and to be 
recognized among the leading countries of the world, a reality that apparently had not 
come to pass due to Congress corruption and incompetence, and that Modi would 
activate. 
 
 
 
(Figure 9: You have to acknowledge: even a lion in the forest is not as carefree. 
And Indian Prime-Ministers always speak from behind a cage on Republic Day and 
Independence Day. So no wonder that Putin salutes him, that Obama bows his 
head in respect, that Pakistan soils its pants, and China can no longer sleep in 
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peace. The country salutes such a fearless and lion-hearted PM. Are you not proud 
of him?)  
 
Another layer of support is located in the realm of the utterly irrational, where 
photos were circulated of Modi‘s face appearing in natural phenomena, such as 
waterfalls. 
 
 
 
(Figure 10) 
 
Twitter bhakts undertake hit-and-run takedowns of politicians opposed to 
Modi: Rahul Gandhi is portrayed as ‗Pappu‘, or a stupid boy, Mayawati the Dalit 
leader attracts negative comments about her looks, and so on. Self-styled ‗internet 
Hindu warriors‘ post, apart from anti-Muslim, anti-opposition tweets, morphed photos 
and videos, jokes and cartoons, which are then ‗liked‘ or re-tweeted. Thus, Twitter 
became an arena for circulating and endorsing official information on Modi, but also 
a vast reservoir of half-truth and untruths, fake news, rumours and slander against 
Modi‘s opponents. Several Twitter handles that posted violent or sexually explicit 
threats against critics, threatened rape violence and death, are followed by Modi. 
‗Proud to be followed by PM Modi‘ is the ultimate badge of honour for a Modi 
supporter, displayed prominently on their profile. Many young people tweet Modi 
begging to be followed, or at least for their tweets to be replied to or liked or 
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retweeted by him. 
My final account of ‗deep hanging out‘ is on five WhatsApp groups, of school 
and college friends and family members. I aimed to observe, in a restricted-access 
setting, middle class support for Modi, what criticism of Modi was permissible, when 
moderators stepped in to stop a conversation, and when people either left or were 
asked to leave the groups as a result of their posts on Modi. When I joined my school 
WhatsApp group, my classmates were aware of my political affiliations and activities 
and initially I was asked not to hold back my views. 
 
Like other platforms, the groups were dominated by Modi supporters. In 2016, 
the moderator of my school group asked me to apologise for calling Modi an ‗agent of 
transnational capital‘, and for stating that his Make In India program was detrimental 
to labour and the environment. I complied, but a group member who was also an 
office holder of the BJP left the group. I was informed that was because the BJP 
social media team wants complete access to party members‘ WhatsApp accounts and 
my posts, and any evidence that he associated with me would show him in a bad light. 
 
Factual and logical refutations of Modi‘s claims of success of his programs 
posted in the groups often elicited the response that this was ‗boring‘ and ‗too 
serious‘. I was taunted for ‗knowing everything happening in India while sitting in 
London‘. When I objected to Indian army action of firing pellets, blinding many 
young protesters in Kashmir, I was attacked for being anti-national. Following my 
criticism of the so-called ―surgical strikes‖ on Pakistan, a few of my class-mates 
threatened to report me to the intelligence services. Many joked, echoing speeches by 
top BJP leaders, that I ―should be sent to Pakistan‖. At this point, I bade good bye to 
the group and left it. I was soon contacted by one of the moderators who said that 
there was a strong feeling of a vocal minority that I should re-join because they felt I 
was saying what they could not, due to the jobs they held, or fear of appearing ‗too 
political‘. After this, some more people on the group began posting anti-Modi 
messages. 
 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by University of Southern California, 
Annenburg in International Journal of Communication: http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/issue/archive   
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online from http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24533/ under CC-
BY-NC-ND 4.0 International Licence  
 
WhatsApp functioned a conduit for hoaxes and jokes. When criticisms of 
Modi‘s lack of delivery became loud in 2016, one post circulated on each group 
claimed that UNESCO had named Modi ‗The Best Prime Minister in the World‘. 
Some forwards of this message were prefaced with a comment directed to me, (―he 
won‘t agree but even UNESCO thinks Modi is the best‖). When this was revealed to 
be a hoax, and I forwarded this to the groups, conversation on the topic stopped, with 
members claiming they had had ‗enough of politics‘ for the day. 
 
Similarly, jokes and cartoons about Rahul Gandhi‘s alleged stupidity, 
Mayawati‘s looks, Lalu Yadav‘s corruption and lack of intelligence, Sonia Gandhi‘s 
Italian origins and the like were common features on all groups. However, if I posted 
jokes and cartoons on Modi, group members objected and asked that the groups not 
be used for ‗politics‘. This cycle repeated itself roughly once every two weeks in my 
school group. On the other groups, talk of ‗politics‘ stands banned, though it still 
filters through, often as jokes and cartoons. 
 
On social media, posts by and about Modi had an interpellative function 
through which millions self-enrolled in the Modi project, responding to centrally 
coordinated dissemination of party information, but also to fake news, forged 
documents, crypto-histories, conspiracy theories, jokes, cartoons, hoaxes, and 
morphed photos and videos of political opponents. These platforms are the sites for 
the construction by the leader of himself and of the people, but also, reciprocally, for 
the construction by the people of themselves and of the leader. These practices 
resembled what Gerbaudo (2012: 6) calls ―a choreography of assembly‖, which 
revolves around an emotional ‗scene-setting‘ and ‗scripting‘ of performances of one-
ness. The comments sections themselves were ―emotional conduits‖ which acted to 
condense ―individual sentiments of indignation, anger, pride and a sense of shared 
victimhood‖ into ―political passions driving the process of mobilisation‖ (Gerbaudo 
2012: 14). Whether these constructions have and stability durability durable political 
is open to question, as Modi‘s legitimacy is challenged by competing populists.  
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Social Media, Counter-archives, and Composing the Counter-People 
 
In criticising Habermas, Fraser challenges his singular conceptualisation of the 
public sphere, arguing that along with dominant versions of the public sphere 
emerged ―competing counter-publics‖ which constituted a ―counter-civil society of 
alternative associations.‖ (Fraser 1996: 61). While the context of her critique and my 
focus here are very different, her identification of the existence of competing and 
contentious ways of constituting the public is relevant in these times of expanding and 
deepening social media penetration. In this section, I borrow elements of Fraser‘s 
critique to outline the emergence of publics and their associational forms that are 
opposed to Modi, and offer alternate possibilities for composing ―the people‖, the 
―leader‖, and their mutual relations. 
For Fraser, it is subordinate groups who seek to form alternative publics. But 
as I argued at the outset, populism muddies the distinction between 
bourgeois/subordinate that animates Fraser‘s critique: sections of the bourgeoisie and 
of subaltern groups combine under the leader into a new formation of the people. It is 
because of the endless heterogeneity of the population that there are, always, many 
possible ―peoples‖. In the context of India‘s highly competitive electoral politics, this 
implies multiple and competing projects of composing ‗the people‘ than the currently 
dominant one. 
While most political parties and figures had limited social media presence 
until 2014, they increased their activity on social media platforms after Modi‘s 
victory. Competing with Modi‘s construction of the ‗leader‘, the ‗people‘ and their 
inter-relations, are those of Arvind Kejriwal and the Aam Aadmi Party, Rahul Gandhi 
and the Congress party, Mayawati and the Bahujan Samaj Party, Mamta Bannerjee 
and Trinamool Congress, and so on. I will focus on the first two challenges listed 
above. I will also highlight the rise of new social movements of Dalits, students, and 
farmers, as non-party instances of de-composing Modi‘s constructs. 
The Aam Aadmi Party emerged from the India Against Corruption movement 
that started in 2011. Initially, leading activists of the movement such as Arvind 
Kejriwal (now Delhi‘s Chief Minister) worked closely with the BJP in highlighting 
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the corruption of the UPA government. They were social media-savvy, and had 
support in the media. When they had mobilized millions on the streets of Delhi 
demanding the resignation of then Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit, prominent TV 
anchors had likened it to the Arab Spring. Together with the Modi media blitz, the 
IAC movement created a sense of impending collapse of the Congress. The main 
beneficiary of this were the BJP and Modi. However, Kejriwal and his followers 
became the BJP‘s adversaries when he led a section of the IAC to became a political 
party, AAP, despite the opposition of BJP luminaries in the movement. Kejriwal went 
into the Delhi assembly election of 2013 accepting Modi‘s leadership, with the slogan 
‗Modi for PM, Kejriwal for CM‘. But Modi and Kejriwal became rivals when AAP 
first formed a government in the support of the Congress, and, in a re-election, won 
67 seat out of 70, the other three going to the BJP.  
Both the IAC and AAP were adept users of social media. With his almost 11 
million twitter followers, Kejriwal ranks second only to Modi among Indian 
politicians. Drawing an exaggerated contrast with Modi, his muffler-man image 
embodies the name of his party (Aam Aadmi Party means The Common Man‘s 
Party), and renders him sartorially indistinguishable from millions of Delhi‘s lower-
middle class and poor residents. If Modi ‗dressed up‘, Kejriwal ‗dressed down‘. In 
addition to Twitter, AAP has used WhatsApp very effectively, and now has a vast 
distribution network on that platform.
12
 The Indian Express tweeted that Kejriwal was 
now the new social media star, with one of his speeches watched by 48 million 
people. 
 
                                                     
12
 In the 2017 Punjab elections, AAP social media strategists claimed that they 
reached 700,000 people in one hour via WhatsApp forwards.   
http://www.news18.com/news/politics/our-war-room-is-whatsapp-say-men-in-charge-
of-aaps-social-media-campaign-1345043.html  
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(Figure 11: Arvind Kejriwal as Muffler Man) 
Rahul Gandhi, too, has joined Twitter since April 2015, a relative newcomer, 
and has 2.2 million followers. The Congress Party official account has close to 2 
million, and some individual leaders have six-figure followings. Congress and AAP 
supporters post links to Modi‘s videos from the past, where he holds positions totally 
contrary to those he professes today. They punch holes in Modi‘s claims of success of 
the Gujarat Model, and circulate stories alleging corruption scams involving Modi‘s 
associates. They use social media to make the case that Modi‘s charges against the 
UPA government were false, and that his performance in power has fallen short of his 
promises or the people‘s expectations. Congress-affiliated handles on Twitter also 
questioned Modi‘s growth claims, lampooning his unorthodox policies as 
#Fekunomics and #Jumlanomics. Congress leaders claim to represent inclusive 
nationalism, drawing a contrast with Modi‘s affiliation with exclusionary Hindu 
supremacist politics.  
Social media did not help Modi win power in many states in 2016 in which the 
narrative of developmentalism he had assiduously cultivated could not dislodge other 
contending models. Congress party, AAP and other parties made heavy use of social 
media during the assembly elections of 2017 to satirize Modi and his floundering 
development agenda. But Modi announced a massive demonetisation of currency, de-
activating 85% of notes in circulation. On the back of this policy, he cleaved the 
electorate into ‗rich vs poor‘, while his surrogates used social media to push an openly 
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majoritarian message. Anti-dalit and anti-Muslim messages were used in the election 
campaign, and in addition to social media, actual violence against Dalits and Muslims 
was used to consolidate the majority Hindu vote, recalling Blom Hansen‘s (2001) 
point that violence is constitutive of Hindutva‘s collective political identity. In the 
end, these narratives and the use of social media to push them won Modi the 
politically important state of UP by an unexpectedly large margin, though the 
Congress won the state of Punjab and a plurality of seats in two other states. Losing 
parties made use of social media to spread reports of electoral malpractice by the BJP 
to delegitimise its victory, though these charges remain unproven. 
Emerging challenges to Modi‘s domination of social media came from Dalit 
or dalit-friendly groups and platforms such as Dalit Camera and Roundtable India that 
point to the anti-dalit bias of Modi‘s BJP (though also of other parties) at a time when 
Modi had included Dalits within his construct of the people. Relatedly, student 
organisations question Modi‘s ‗youth icon‘ status based on criticism of his education 
and youth policies, and who resist repression on campus of their activities. The new 
farmers‘ movements use social media, especially WhatsApp, for mobilising and 
coordinating actions. Additionally, there are highly active but dispersed individuals 
who produce and disseminate content on social media. 
To form a ‗counter-people‘, there must be a ‗counter-archive‘ on which to 
build a counter-narrative. Modi had used media reports, WikiLeaks, and statements 
and speeches by Congress and UPA leaders themselves to build his counter-narrative. 
The most important counter-archive for Modi‘s critics proved to be Modi‘s own 
speeches and statements archived on YouTube. Early into his PM-ship, the hashtag 
#CM_Modi_Trolls_PM_Modi was deployed. Clips showed Modi the campaigner 
opposing key UPA policies such as the rural employment guarantee, universal 
identity cards, general sales tax, foreign direct investment in retail, price rise, falling 
value of the rupee etc., and promising to reverse them when he came to power. These 
were juxtaposed to recent footage, after assuming office, when he supports these 
policies, with news of prices rise and the fall of the rupee, much more than in the 
UPA days. Variations on Modi‘s #AchheDin hashtags were developed to mock 
Modi‘s failure in delivering key aspects of his promise. Modi‘s clip threatening 
Pakistan on Aap ki Adalat were juxtaposed with pictures of his unannounced visit to 
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Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif‘s family birthday party. Indeed, Modi‘s clampdown on 
social media in Kashmir or in areas of farmers‘ or dalit movements, and record 
numbers of request by his government to social media firms to suppress content, is 
highlighted to indicate the hollowness of his claims over social media. 
Takedowns of Modi highlighted the lack of clarity on his marital status, 
secrecy over his educational qualifications and his degrees, and his relations with 
disgraced godmen. The term ‗Feku‘ (someone who tells tall tales) gained wide 
currency. Attacks on his person reached a highpoint when, during Barack Obama‘s 
2015 visit to India, Modi was photographed wearing a very expensive suit, giving rise 
to Rahul Gandhi‘s jibe about Modi leading a ‗suit-boot ki sarkar‘ (a government for 
the well-heeled). Unverified stories of his allegedly extravagant tastes, cartoons and 
jokes lampooning his 56-inch chest, rumours, sexual innuendo and slander also were 
released on various platforms, aimed at separating Modi from his brand, and to show 
him as someone whose claims of humble background, identity with the poor and the 
youth, were inauthentic and non-credible. As in Modi‘s case, his opponents too attack 
sections of the media, with those now seen as closely engaged in protecting him from 
criticism labelled #Modia. More recently, exposing the disastrous consequences of 
demonetisation, continued attacks by Pakistan, and lampooning of his personal style 
are common on social media.
13
 Twitter handles such as @SMHoaxSlayer and @alt-
news fact check and expose Modi and the BJP‘s exaggerated claims. 
Human rights, Dalit and student movements opposing Modi circulated footage 
of the crackdown on campus Dalit activists following the suicide of Dalit student 
leader Rohit Vemula at Hyderabad Central University in 2016, and more recently, 
atrocities on Dalits and Muslims by Hindutva cow protection vigilante groups. This 
challenged Modi‘s composition of the people, which had included Dalits and youth, 
without whom such a people would not have satisfied the electoral arithmetic to come 
to power. The ubiquity of the mobile phone made it possible to film such actions and 
to post it almost immediately on social media, where their circulation took a logic 
                                                     
13
 However, following the assassination of Gauri Lankesh, a Kannada language 
journalist ridiculing Modi and Hindutva in her writings, a prominent satirical site, 
Humans of Hindutva has closed itself down. 
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internal to the platform.  
Modi‘s social media dominance was challenged also by activists who searched 
out threatening or abusive tweets from Modi fans and reported them to Twitter, 
forcing accounts to be suspended or shut down, and reporting to relevant police 
jurisdictions when needed. Videos and photos sent out by Modi-friendly accounts 
were identified as photo-shopped and morphed, and those who posted them were 
lampooned and humiliated as #LowIQBhakts. Television anchors such as Arnab 
Goswami, Rahul Kanwal, Sanjiv Chaudhary, Rohit Sardana and Gaurav Sawant, who 
are explicitly pro-Modi, were extensively trolled. The journalist Swati Chaturvedi, in 
her 2016 book I Was a BJP Troll, exposed the role of trolling, and other Twitter 
handles exposed fake news and its role in Modi‘s image maintenance.  
However, while there is vigorous challenge to Modi now on all social media 
platforms, I do not imply that a counter-people has already emerged. True, Modi‘s 
critics were united in a common opposition, but between AAP supporters and those of 
the Congress and Dalit, feminist and communist groups there are also 
incommensurate positions. There is appreciation for AAP rapid rise, the simplicity of 
its leaders, and the high degrees of voluntary labour undertaken by its activists, but 
also suspicion of its RSS-affiliated origins, and its past of opposing caste-based 
reservations. These have produced ephemeral solidarities on social media. There is 
appreciation for the energetic challenge posed to Modi by Rahul Gandhi and the 
Congress, but unease about lingering allegations of financial wrong doing, and its 
identification with dynastic politics. The radical presence of Dalits on social media 
has pluralised the very idea of solidarity, while simultaneously problematizing it, as 
they have been critical of the communist parties. What is clear is that Modi as ‗leader‘ 
and his composition of ‗the people‘ is less firm today, making it possible for its 
component parts to be recombined into another version of ‗the people‘. But Modi‘s 
dominance over this social media continues because he has, for now a fuller narrative 
than his challengers. 
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Conclusion: Populism as Continuous Contention, or the Fragility of 
Hegemony 
In discussions on populism, it is important to remember that in two of its 
‗predecessor‘ forms, Bonapartism and Caesarism, the strong leader emerges to 
compose the people in response to multiple crises. As Mouffe (1988) notes, crises, to 
become politically charged contradictions and antagonisms, require discourse. In this 
paper, I have shown that Modi‘s social media discourse and strategy identified a 
number of crises: an economic crisis seen in declining growth rates, falling 
employment and rising prices; a crisis of parliamentarianism in the classic Gramscian 
sense (Frosini 2014) seen in the inability of other parties to represent those they 
claimed as core supporters; a crisis of security and law and order, seen in the terror 
attacks on the border and gang rapes in the capital; and a crisis of morality seen in the 
alleged corruption of scam-tainted ministers. In sum they represented an ―integral 
crisis‖, in which ―conventional hegemonic apparatuses are no longer able to build 
consent by normal means‖ (Caruso 2016: 143). Modi‘s ‗verbal radicalism‘ sharpened 
these crises into contradictions between the then-leaders and the people, and created 
antagonism between them.  
These strategies of becoming the leader of the people happened at a time of 
the ―irruption of the masses into political life‖ (Frosini 2014: 524) through media and 
social media, to which Modi introduced a plebiscitary dimension, by, for example 
asking call-and-response in public rallies, and via tweets, retweets, forwards and likes 
on social media. They recall the situation in which ―faith and irrational passions 
become determining elements of political life.‖ (Frosini 2014: 529) In this milieu, 
social media has become part of the ―private apparatuses of hegemony,‖ having a 
―complementary role in exerting political power.‖ (Caruso 2016: 142). However, as I 
have pointed, ‗the people‘ do not exist prior to their composition-as-such, suggesting 
the contingency, indeterminacy and thus instability involved in the very idea of ―the 
people‖.  
With the ascendancy of Modi in 2014, and the ‗movement‘ style of his 
politics, one that has subsequently been emulated by AAP and the Congress (as well 
as others) the separation between party and social movement style and content has 
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virtually dissolved. As Caruso (2016: 154) notes, within media, especially social 
media, ―a ‗participatory‘ turning point has occurred. Everyday life and ‗ordinary 
people‘ have been firmly placed in the communication flow. Newspapers, websites 
and television programmes are constantly asking the viewer/reader to intervene with 
votes, comments, remarks and testimonies.‖ This simulates ―the dissolving of 
intermediate bodies of democracy into direct relationship between people and power.‖ 
In that sense, Indian populism today would be virtually unimaginable without media 
and social media.  
However, for two reasons, today‘s populism cannot become hegemonic, and 
we will not have the long-duration rule by populists as seen in the days of classic 
populism. First, the crises to which populism is a response are continuous and newer 
dimensions of it are revealed daily. In Modi‘s case, the crisis of growth, of jobs, of 
agricultural productivity, have deepened, due to his own policies such as 
demonetisation. That the leader who promised to resolve the crisis, and to compose a 
people around such promise, is unable to fulfil his promise, is testing Modi‘s capacity 
to maintain his hold over ‗the people‘, and prevent their disintegration into alternate 
compositions. Second, social media provides a platform for continuous interrogation 
of the claims of leader and their supporters, allowing for attempts at undermining the 
ruling leader-people configuration. Rather than produce anything as stable as 
hegemony, social media in India is a vehicle for a politics of continuous contention 
between varieties of populism, and a contested terrain.
14
 In such a context, because all 
compositions of ‗the people‘ are unstable and therefore transitory, the formation of a 
historic bloc as the bearer of hegemony is difficult: ruling notions of the ‗people‘ and 
the ‗leader‘, under constant scrutiny and attack within and outside of social media, 
retain a fragility that cannot be contained by persuasion and consent alone, relying 
increasingly on active coercion by state and non-state entities, and the complicity of a 
                                                     
14
 Modi‘s government has record number of requests to Facebook and Twitter to 
block users and content, most recently on Kashmir and demonetisation. See 
https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2016/12/26/indias-requests-for-information-
about-facebook-users-rises-again/ and http://www.dailyo.in/variety/internet-
shutdown-kashmir-social-media-digital-india/story/1/19342.html.  
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plurality of the population. 
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